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I. INTRODUCTION
All students of military history learn quickly that
logistics organization is crucial to any successful military
operation. The invasion of Granada in the summer of 1983
graphically illustrated the advantage of being able to move
troops, equipment and supplies quickly and efficiently.
Yet, the cost of this support capability has been a hotly
debated issue, particularly since the United States left
Vietnam. In 1972, the Brookings Institute published a
report stating that support costs had grown to fully
one-third of the total defense budget. [Ref. 1]
Perhaps no military service is more sensitive to the
issue of logistic support than the United States Navy. The
limited storage capacity of ships, combined with the isola-
tion from shore-based logistic resupply points when on the
high seas, places a premium on effective logistics support.
Admiral Thomas Moorer, in testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee in October, 1977, stated the view of many
combat commanders regarding logistics support.
"We're not interested in the cost per ton mile. We
might take a C-9 (aircraft) and fly five pounds to Rota
(Spain) so a $300 million sub can get underway. How
things work today is meaningless, what matters is how
it's going to work during a war. The key question is:
How do you best maintain fleet readiness at sea?"
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While that view is completely understandable during
wartime, and certainly not without historical precedent, it
is difficult to defend in its entirety in today's atmosphere
of high prices and constrained budgets. Logistics planners
are becoming increasingly aware that while wartime effec-
tiveness is crucial, peacetime efficiency is also vital. If
credibility is to be maintained, the Congress and the public
must become convinced that logistic support costs are being
adequately controlled.
Obviously, the term Logistic Support encompasses a wide
variety of issues, costs, and commands within any given
service. One area that has been subjected to intense and
continuing criticism is the Navy Air Logistics organization.
Since 1975, Comptroller General Reports and Naval Audit
Service Reports have criticized the system and the indivi-
dual commands within the the system for inefficient use of
assigned aircraft assets.
During the summer of 1983, the Naval Air Logistics
Control Office, Eastern Pacific (NALCOEP), one of subordi-
nate scheduling commands within the air logistics organiza-
tion, requested assistance from the Naval Postgraduate
School in examining their utilization of assigned air-
craft. Since many NALCOEP decisions are influenced by
system-wide policies and regulations, any analysis must
necessarily begin with an understanding of NALCOEP's place in
the Navy Air Logistics system.
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A. NAVY AIR LOGISTICS SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The basis for a Navy organic airlift capability resides
in the United States Code [Ref. 2], and the Navy Air
Logistics System is a direct result of this authority.
However, specific justification for this capability, and
methodology for determining its effectiveness, has never
been fully developed. The system is controlled by Depart-
ment of Defense and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
policies. The Chief of Naval Reserve has been designated
as CNO Executive Agent for Department of the Navy (DON)
Organic Airlift [Ref. 3], The Navy Air Logistics Office
(NALO) has been established as a member of the staff of the
Chief of Naval Reserves specifically to perform this
function. In addition to scheduling some of the aircraft
assets assigned to the system, the mission statement of this
office charges it with:
- the development of organic airlift management
policy for the Navy;
- the operation of an aircraft data collection and
information system;
- the coordination of schedules of Navy organic
airlift aircraft within CONUS;
- the implementation of advanced aircraft scheduling
techniques at Navy and Marine Corps airlift
scheduling activities;
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The overall organization of the Navy's Air Logistics
System within the continental United States is reflected in
Figure 1. The type and number of aircraft scheduled by each
command is listed below each scheduler. Four items are
worth noting.
First, while NALO is charged with the development of
policy, it is subject to the guidance and requirements of
the Chief of Naval Reserve and the CNO. Obviously,
Secretary of Defense policy must also be observed.
Second, each regional scheduler is responsible to
two distinct commands. Obviously, each command is
responsible to NALO for adhering to system policies and
procedures. Additionally, each scheduler is also respon-
sible to Commander, Naval Air Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet;
Commander, Naval Air Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, or
Commandant, Marine Corps; for operational support. This
can create a conflict for schedulers as they try to meet the
policies levied by NALO while simultaneously attempting to
meet the requirements of their respective operational
commanders. This is particularly true when the operational
commander desires transportation for only one or two
personnel. While such a flight may not be economically
feasible for the system, funds are often not made available
for alternative transportation arrangements.
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Third, though each scheduler controls the aircraft,
the Station Commanding Officer owns the aircraft and is
responsible for providing crews from station personnel. No
billets exist to support the aircraft and all missions are
assigned as "Additional Duty." This became quite evident
during the analysis of the data and will be discussed again
at that point.
Fourth, the aircraft assignments shown were current
at the end of Fiscal Year 83 and do not accurately represent
the assignment of assets at the beginning of that Fiscal
Year. Several aircraft had been reassigned in December
1982. This will be touched upon again briefly in Chapter IV.
2. Policy
The primary policy guidance followed throughout the
system is most succinctly stated in letter to Commander in
Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Although the letter is
several years old, the basic policy has not changed.
"Among the actions necessary are the absolute
adherance to both the spirit and the letter of DON and
OPNAV directives regarding use of our organic airlift
aircraft. In general, this means that Navy organic
aircraft will be used to meet requirements which are
justified by wartime training requirements, urgency,
security, or military effectiveness and then only when
the lift is outside the recognized mission of commercial
carriers or the Military Airlift Command. In every
case, the lift chosen must be the lowest cost mode that
will adequately meet the requirement." [Ref. 4]
This guidance has been implemented in practice by
specifying that assets employed in air logistic support
shall not be utilized for predictable passenger movements
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and routine supply or resupply operations which can be
performed by MAC (Military Airlift Command) or commercial
contract air service. [Ref. 5] Specific purposes for
flights have been spelled out in several official instruc-
tions [Ref. 6], [Ref. 7]; however, these purposes can be
summarized in three key phrases [Ref. 8]:
- Short-fuzed - unscheduled, short-notice requirements;
- Low Volume - requirements which cannot be predicted to
occur with regularity due to their infrequent nature;
- High Priority - requirements necessitating immediate
action on the part of the logistics organization.
B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
It quickly became obvious to the author that the initial
problem, examining the utilization of assigned aircraft, was
significantly larger and more complex than could be handled
within the available time and resources. Referring again to
Figure 1, it can be seen that over 100 aircraft could be
involved in the analysis. Discussions with the database
custodian, NALO, indicated that such an analysis would
involve well in excess of 300,000 individual records (See
Chapter 2). Finally, no measures of efficiency within the
system have been identified, therefore some measure of the
relative efficiency of each base when compared to all other
bases needed to be developed.
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The only practical method of limiting the scope of the
investigation was to restrict the analysis to one type of
aircraft. The T-39 Sabreliner, a seven passenger jet air-
craft, is primarily a Flag Officer support aircraft. Only
14 exist in the system, therefore it was eliminated. Of the
two remaining aircraft controlled by NALCOEP, the UC-12 and
the DC-9, the C-12 appeared to offer the most local,
autonomous control and had the least well defined mission.
The 39 aircraft throughout the NALO system constituted the
largest single aircraft type and it was decided to use the
C-12 aircraft in this initial analysis.
The question of efficient utilization still encompassed
a large number of variables, even after restricting consid-
eration to one type of aircraft. Among the questions being
asked by NALCOEP were:
- What type of basing should be used? Station aircraft as
is currently being done, or creation of C-12
aircraft s-quadrons?
- In either case, where should the aircraft be home-based?
- What measure of efficiency was appropriate to the
command mission?
- What type of maintenance program should be used?
Civilian contract as is currently being done, or
should Navy personnel be used?
- Could more customer requests be met by a different
scheduling technique? What kind?
Additional discussions led to the decision to place more
restrictions on the initial area of analysis. One of
NALCOEP's concerns regarding the C-12 aircraft was that it
17
was in a five-year procurement plan and more aircraft were
due to be delivered over the next two to three years. The
most immediate benefits could be derived from determining
the best locations for some of these new aircraft.
C. THESIS PURPOSE
This thesis will attempt to determine the best location
for new C-12 aircraft. It begins with analyses of current
locations and their operations. It then attempts to eval-
uate the relative efficiency of these bases in using the
C-12. It will then attempt to determine if any of the




Chapter II will discuss the data available for analysis
and how the system obtains this data. It will also discuss
the problems discovered in the data and explain the reasons
for distilling the data prior to analysis.
Chapter III describes the initial analysis performed on
the data. It presents several graphical views of the data,
describes potential variables of interest and the reasoning
used to isolate the significant variables.
18
Chapter IV contains a more detailed analysis. It
includes the interpretation of several of the graphs,
explanations for several of the outliers observed in Chapter
III, and suggests measures of performance for evaluating
aircraft usage.
Chapter V presents the conclusions of the analyses and
recommendations for action. It also suggests several
additional areas for further study and analysis.
19
1 1 . DATA
Prior to any analysis, a description of the nature of
the available data should be provided. No valid interpre-
tations can be drawn without knowing the source of the data.
It would be impossible to draw inferences or identify
anomolies without a knowledge of the structure of the data
and how the data is affected by the aircraft under consid-
eration. This chapter will therefore attempt to consider
such issues. It begins with a brief description of the C-12
aircraft and is followed by a description of the data and
how it is obtained. The structure of the database will then
be reviewed. Finally, the rationale for the specific data
selected for this thesis is presented.
A. THE UC-12B AIRCRAFT
The UC-12B aircraft is a twin-engine turbo-prop aircraft
manufactured by the Beech Aircraft Company. Its commercial
equivalent is a Beech Super King Air Model 200. In its
standard configuration it can carry seven passengers and
approximately 400 pounds of baggage or cargo. The seats can
be removed, allowing for a full cargo load of approximately
2,000 pounds. This configuration is seldom used, however,
due to the difficulty in removing the seats and the lack of
onboard cargo-handling equipment. The aircraft is typically
20
used for short, commuter-type flights between air stations
and is seldom used on cross-country flights. It requires a
fuel stop every 800 to 1,200 miles depending on passenger
and/or cargo load. With an average speed of 200 miles per
hour, the aircraft is limited to a range of 1,200 miles
without an overnight rest stop for the crew, which consists
of a pilot, a co-pilot, and an aircrewman.
B. DATA SOURCES
The data which will be described in the next section is
derived primarily from three sources: the customers, the
schedulers, and the aircrews. This section will describe
the process of requesting, scheduling, and reporting a
flight. These procedures are spelled out in depth in
OPNAVINST 4631. 2B [Ref. 2]. Emphasis will be placed on the
relationship between each action and the data collected.
1. .Requesting a Flight
In general, customers desiring a flight send a
message to the appropriate scheduling command in Figure 1,
Chapter I. The message is formatted according to the OPNAV
Instruction cited above, and several different flights may
be requested in the same message. A copy of a typical
message is shown in Figure A.l of Appendix A. This message
is the primary source of data in the Flight Request File, to
be discussed in Section C.l below. The information enters
the computerized database by a method known as "Message
21
Cracking" - a computerized algorithm wherein the computer
itself deciphers the message and appends the information to
the database.
In addition to the Flight Request Message, NALO
maintains a "Walk-Up Window" which is manned by the staff
and equipped with a computer terminal. Requests at this
window are manually entered on the terminal using the same
format as the message.
Telephone inquiries as to flight availability are an
everyday occurrence at all scheduling commands and there
does not appear to be a standardized method of handling
these inquiries, at least in practice. Theoretically, all
requests for flights must eventually be submitted by message
or via the NALO walkup window. However, in many cases when
requests received by telephone can not be accommodated, the
required official message request is never released by the
customer. This results in a loss of demand data to the
system. It is estimated by NALCOEP and NALO staff that as
much as 80 percent of such "flight regret" information is
never recorded as a system demand.
2. Scheduling a Flight
The Flight Advisory Message is the primary means of
communication between the schedulers, the customers and
aircrews. It consists of a message to the requesting
customer and other appropriate commands that the request
has been accepted, passed to another scheduling command, or
22
that their request can not be accommodated and the reason
for the rejection of the request. The latter message is
called a regret message because of its opening phrase
"REGRET UNABLE... ."
The most common type of Flight Advisory Message is
that which schedules a flight. An example of this type of
message is shown in Figure A. 2 of Appendix A. Although this
particular example schedules a flight for a C-9 aircraft,
the format is the same for all types of aircraft. From the
information in the Flight Requests, the scheduler puts
together a flight itinerary. Each flight consists of from
one to perhaps ten or more "lifts" or "legs." Although
there are some minor differences between the two terms, for
the purpose of this thesis "lifts" and "legs" can be consid-
ered interchangable and apply to that segment of a flight
which starts with one takeoff and ends with the next consec-
utive landing. Chapter III will examine the distribution of
the number of legs per flight.
As can be seen from the Figure A. 2, each message
consists of two parts. Paragraph one is the general
schedule of the flight and includes how many passenger seats
are still available, or how much cargo space is still
available, on the given leg. This information is generated
from the Flight Advisory File to be discussed in section
C.2.
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Paragraphtwo consists of the details of each leg of the
flight and includes how many seats and how much cargo is
scheduled, the command receiving the transportation, and the
local flight coordinator. The Flight Lift File, to be
discussed in Section C.3, generates this section of the
message. The information for this message is entered
manually by the scheduler (or a clerk/assistant) and becomes
a part of the database. 72 to 96 hours before the scheduled
departure, the computer generates the message for release.
This message is transmitted to other scheduling commands, to
bases where the aircraft will stop, and to commands which
have passengers scheduled on the flight. These commands, and
other commands with access to the message files of the
receiving commands, have the opportunity to request any of
the available seats.
3. Reporting a Flight
At the conclusion of the flight, the pilot files a
Logistics Flight Report, shown in Appendix B. This informa-
tion is also entered into the computer and appended to the
Logistics Flight Report File to be discussed in Section C.4,
subsequently linking the original Flight Requests to the
Flight Advisory messages through three keyed fields. It
provides information on the number of passengers and cargo
flown (both scheduled and opportune lift), the actual




The computer system which collects' this data is
located at CHNAVRES Headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana.
A command-programmed DataBase Management System (DBMS)
maintains extensive records on all demands for service as
well as actual airlifts conducted. Within the DBMS environ-
ment, NALO can obtain any information it requires, in any
format desired.
A DataBase Management System provides a random access
capability to any file with which it communicates and allows
the interactive combination or joining of file records to
obtain specific information. The advantage of such a
program is that data can be stored much more compactly and
each file holds a minimum of information duplicated in other
files. The underlying physical structure of the data is
still the familiar files. However, the user does not commu-
nicate directly with the files and, in fact, may not know
that they even exist. For example, a complete record of all
data regarding one flight, from the original request mes-
sages to the Logistics Flight Report, can be obtained with-
out the user ever accessing the files directly; yet it
requires the DBMS to physically access all four files.
The NALO database resides on a disk pack which provides
immediate use and access to any file. However, the transfer
of data requires transferring the actual files. Since the
actual programming for DataBase Management Systems is both
25
hardware and language-implementation dependent, the programs
themselves were not transferred to the Postgraduate School.
While the ability to access the data as a full-capability
data base would have been quite convenient, the time
required to develop such a program seemed disproportionate
to the advantages to be gained. Therefore, the data for the
thesis was provided as four, independent, sequential files
on magnetic tape. The contents of each of these files is
described below.
1. Flight Request File
The Flight Request File contains complete informa-
tion on all requests for service, irrespective of the final
action taken on the request. It is compiled from the
requests for service received from potential customers as
described in Section B above. Appendix C, Table C.l,
provides a complete record description with Field Titles,
Field Size and a brief description of the data contained in
each field. Although each record contains a large amount of
data, there is no direct indication within this file of
which aircraft, aircraft type, or base might have been
assigned to service the request. There is a only a column




The Flight Advisory File
This file contains the information necessary to
compose paragraph one of the Flight Advisory message. As
discussed above, the information in this file is entered
manually by the scheduling command. Appendix C, Table C.2,
provides a detailed description of the record format, which
is similar to the Flight Request File. The information in
each of the records of this file is basically a summary of
the information contained in the Flight Legs File, described
below. Its primary value, in an analytical sense, is in
gaining an overview of flights scheduled versus flight
flown.
3. The Flight Lift File
This file contains the information necessary to
compose paragraph two of the Flight Advisory message and
contains details of each leg of the flight as scheduled. A
detailed description of the record format for this file can
be found in Appendix C, Table C.3, and follows the same
style as the others. The information in this file would be
of primary interest in an analysis of customer utilization




The Logistics Flight Report File
As described above, this file contains the informa-
tion on flights actually flown. A detailed description of
this file record is shown in Appendix C, Table C.4. This
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file contains keyed fields connecting it with the Flight
Request File and with the Flight Advisory and Flight Legs
Files. It is the only file which is keyed to both of the
other major files. It also provides, without requiring
access to the other files, all the data necessary to analyze
and understand the current operation of the Navy Air
Logistics System.
D. SELECTION OF DATA
Because the Data Collection System has been undergoing
continual change and refinement since it was installed in
1981, the consensus of both NALCOEP and NALO was that the
Fiscal Year 82 data was incomplete and undependable. Thus,
1983 was selected because it represented the first complete
fiscal year of relative stability, both in the slowing of
major changes to the system and in the training of all the
scheduling commands in the maintenance and use of the
database.
The selection of a readily identifiable time interval
was considered to be important to allow for future analysis
and comparison, whether as a follow-on thesis effort or as
an in-house effort on the part of NALO or NALCOEP. The
Government Fiscal Year is an obvious choice of a time inter-
val because it is readily accepted and identifiable. During
initial discussions on which time interval was appropriate,
there was some initial concerns within NALO as to whether
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there might be a drop in the number of flights due to insuf-
ficient funds at the end of a Fiscal Year, and/or an
increase in the number of flights at the beginning of a
Fiscal Year as more fuel funds and travel funds become
available. The selection of the Fiscal Year was seen as a
logical resolution since it has the advantage of restricting
any such funding distortions to the endpoints of the time
interval.
After eliminating records not dealing with the C-12
aircraft, a cursory examination of the data files was
conducted. The usefulness of the Flight Request File was
questionable. Without any indication of which base and/or
which type of aircraft might have flown a regretted flight,
analysis of unsatisfied demand would have been limited to
overall totals. A Fortran program was written to obtain
those totals and the results indicated a large number of
unfilled requests from one particular location. While this
might have indicated that one command was conscientious in
its documentation of requests for service, subsequent
discussion with the cognizant scheduler indicated that this
was not the case. This particular command consistently
submitted requests for service immediately before, and in
many cases, after the requested departure time. The command
maintained small aircraft, such as Cessnas, which were out-
side the control of the Navy Air Logistics System and the
scheduler believed that these late requests were an effort
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to manipulate the system database to justify their continued
possession and use of these small aircraft. This made the
veracity of the Flight Request File sufficiently question-
able to eliminate its use for further statistical analysis
without a validation of the service requests. Such valida-
tion would have required interviewing all commands whose
flight requests were rejected. Such an effort would not
have made a significant contribution to the preliminary
analyses being conducted and was deferred for a follow-on
thesis effort.
The Flight Advisory and Flight Lift Files, while
providing a very detailed picture of the intended flight,
were missing information such as time and distance which was
necessary to understand current system operation. However,
because of the keyed fields referred to above, one file
contained all the desired information in a single record and
led to the elimination of these two files from further
consideration. In terms of understanding the operation of
the system, it was obvious that the most useful information
was available in the Logistics Flight Report File. It
provided air time, mileage, origin, and destination for each
leg directly and the elapsed clock time and several addi-
tional pieces of information could be easily computed for
each flight. This file will be used for all subsequent
analysis in this thesis.
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has looked at the C-12 aircraft. Its capa-
bilities and limitations provide, in some sense, bounds on
what can be expected in the data. The chapter has also
examined how the data is collected and how it is structured.
The strengths and weaknesses of the data as it is structured
has been reviewed and the Logistics Flight Report File has
been identified as the best file to analyze.
31
III. INITIAL ANALYSIS
Chapter II defined the structure of the available data.
The purpose of this chapter is data analysis. It seemed
appropriate to begin with a type of top-down analysis, using
some techniques from the field of Exploratory Data Analysis.
The purpose was to get a feel for the data and determine
what information was available and useful. A natural result
of this type of analysis is an indication of directions for
additional investigation. Throughout this chapter, questions
will be raised and outliers in the data will be highlighted.
However, the further investigation and resolution of these
issues will be deferred until Chapter IV.
A. AGGREGATION OF DATA
The basic unit of data is the flight leg, defined in
Chapter II. The Logistics Flight Record File had 12,361
individual records, each describing one leg flown by a C-12
aircraft. This level of detail would be quite useful in
some follow-on studies such as determining high-density
traffic patterns or investigations dealing with the effects
of weather on flight times and/or actual distance flown.
However, it is much too detailed for the current level of
analysis.
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The next higher level data structure is a round-trip
flight and the first step in the analysis was to combine the
individual records into such flight records. This reduced
the size of the database to 3,858 records. At this level of
aggregation, the following information was also available,
either by direct summation of the original fields or by
computation after the aggregation has been accomplished.
Mission Number
Aircraft Serial Number
Date and time of flight commencement
Date and time of flight termination
Number of hours in the air
Number of hours on the ground
Number of hours of delay time in excess of normal
terminal service
Total number of legs in the flight
Total distance travelled
Number of passenger-carrying legs
Distance flown with passengers aboard
Number of passenger miles flown
Passenger capacity
Utilization of passenger capacity
Number of cargo-carrying legs (arbitrarily determined
as those legs with cargo and without passengers)




utilization of cargo capacity
Number of deadhead legs. As used by the system, a
deadhead leg is flown by the same crew in the same
aircraft but without passengers or cargo. This is not
the same definition as that used in commercial
aviation.
Distance flown in deadhead state.
The next step was to sort the data by home base because
they are also potential sites for locating new aircraft.
The following information was available for analysis after
the second step.
- Numbers of aircraft at each base
- Total number of flights flown by each base during Fiscal
Year 1983
- Total flight time for each base
- Total number of passengers moved by each base
- Total passenger miles flown by each base
- Total cargo tonnage moved by each base
- Total cargo weight-miles flown by each base
- Total number of legs flown by each base
- Total passenger-carrying legs flown by each base
- Total cargo-only legs flown by each base
- Total deadhead distance flown by each base
- Average passenger capacity utilization for each base
- Average number of legs per flight for each base
- Average cost per passenger-mile for each base; the sum
of total cost per flight, based on $120.00 per hour
current cost figure provided by NALCOEP, divided by
the number of flights
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- Average percentage of deadhead flight time for each
base; the sum of the actual ratio of deadhead flight
flight hours per flights, divided by the number of
flights
- Average deadhead cost per flight for each base; the
deadhead time per flight times the cost per hour ($120),
summed over all flights and then divided by the number
of flights
- Average number of flights per month for each base; the
total number of flights for 1983, divided by the number
of months the base was operational
- Average total elapsed time hours per month for each
base; the sum of all flight hours during 1983, divided
by the number of months the base was operational
- Average number of flights per month per aircraft for
each base; the average number of flights per month
divided by the number of Aircraft assigned to that base
- Average elapsed time hours per month per aircraft for
each base; the average elapsed time hours per month
divided by the number of aircraft assigned
As indicated in Chapter II. A, the C-12 aircraft is
seldom used for cargo transportation. Less than three
percent (330 records) of the Logistics Flight Report File
were cargo-only legs. As a result, the data on cargo-only
flights will be disregarded in further analysis. Addition-
ally, many of the variables above portray the same informa-
tion. Total passenger miles and total passengers tend
to be functions of the number of aircraft at a base,
as are total flights, total flight time, total legs, total
passenger legs and total deadhead legs. The information in
these variables can be better represented, in some cases, by
computed variables such as average cost, average flights per
month, or average deadhead cost per flight. Using similar
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reasoning, the data can be reduced to the following
variables with one value for each of the 23 bases.
- Number of aircraft assigned; a discrete variable with
only three possible values; 1, 2, or 3
- Average flights per month; a functionally continuous
variable ranging from 6.75 to 25.17
- Average flights per month per aircraft; a continuous
variable ranging from 5.29 to 15.50
- Average elapsed time (hours) per month; a continuous
variable ranging from 64.98 to 344.33
- Average elapsed time (hours) per month per aircraft; a
continuous variable ranging from 41.53 to 127.29
- Average percentage of deadhead distance; a continuous
variable computed by summing the ratio of deadhead dis-
tance to total distance for each flight and dividing by
the total number of flights. It ranges from 0.12 to
0.30.
- Average deadhead cost per flight; a continuous variable
computed by multiplying actual deadhead air time by the
current cost per hour, summing over all flights for each
base and dividing by the total number of flights for
that base. This variable ranges from $80.02 to $186.13
- Average passenger capacity utilization; a continuous
variable computed by summing over all legs not used
strictly for cargo for each base and dividing by the
total number of legs for each base. This variable
ranges from 0.37 to 0.93
- Average cost per passenger-mile; a continuous variable
ranging from $0,195 to $0,333
- Average number of legs per flight; a continuous variable
ranging from 2.83 to 4.75
This data can be displayed as a 23 x 10 matrix. It is
shown with row and column titles in Appendix D.
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B. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
Having reduced the data to a manageable and under-
standable format, the analysis began with a broad view of
the data to see if possible correlations or indications of
directions for further investigation were suggested. Graphs
of some of the information involving the entire database
were constructed to check initial assumptions and expecta-
tions. This was followed by construction of a Draftsman's
Plot. Then some Coded Scatterplots were constructed to
clarify questions arising from the Draftsman's Plot. Each
of these techniques are discussed below.
1. Initial Investigations
The crew-time limitations of the C-12 aircraft imply
that a multi-modal distribution of flight times could be
expected and it might also be expected that a vast majority
of flights would have a duration of less than one day.
However, that is not at all clear from the raw data. Figure
2 displays a histogram with a class interval of 15
minutes. It clearly shows a distribution that is exactly as
expected. The distribution is highly skewed with a vast
majority of flights lasting between three and 12 hours.
Additional modes can be seen at about 30 hours and again at
about 45 hours. Flights beyond 75 hours were not shown
because there were too few of them to register on a graph
showing the entire range of values. These three modes are
consistent with safety regulations which require a 17 hour
37


















































rest stop whenever the flight crew will be on duty for more
than 12 hours. Total elapsed flight time, as defined above,
includes these rest stops since the aircraft is away from
home base and unavailable for additional use even if another
crew was available. The existence of flights during the
period from 12 to 24 hours a reflects flights requiring a
round-trip flight time in excess of 12 hours and flights
requiring an overnight stop on official business even though
a crew rest stop would not have been required.
The next issue investigated was the question of
possible correlation between flight time and distance. It
is unlikely that any combination of readily available data
could be used to predict the total flight time. Actual
times are affected by altitude, weather, trade winds, fuel
conservation policies, and perhaps, by other variables as
well. The length of the flight, particularly those measured
in days, might well be a function of the grade and rank of
the passenger being serviced. The primary interest in this
issue is to identify any unexpected trends or anomolies.
Figure 3 displays a scatterplot of elapsed flight time
versus total distance flown. It is easy to see a general
trend for flights lasting less than 12 hours. A line with
slope 1/200 appears to fit that portion of the graph quite
well and reflects the average airspeed of the C-12 air-
craft... 200 miles per hour. Additional groupings for
elapsed time can be seen which reflect the second and third
39
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modes in Figure 2, and obviously indicate flights with one
and two overnight rest stops. These groupings appear to also
correlate with the average airspeed of the C-12.
In Chapter 11/ it was stated that a flight could
consist of as few as one leg and that some flights had in
excess of ten legs. However, it is difficult to determine
from the raw data just how the number of legs per flight is
distributed. Figure 4 shows that a vast majority of the
flights consist of from two to four legs, with few flights
above eight legs or less than two legs. The 42 flights
consisting of only one leg are worth noting because a flight
is normally a round-trip. These one-leg flights may
indicate that the rest of the flight is missing from the
database or, more likely, they may indicate flights in
which the aircraft was away from home base so long that a
new flight number was assigned when it finally returned. An
examination of the database did not produce a clear explan-
ation of the phenomenon. However, since these flights
represented only about one percent of the data, the matter
was not persued.
Another question of interest is whether the average
number of flights flown by the system varies from month to
month. Different analysis techniques might be appropriate
if the number of flights flown, or the hours flown, remained
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Box and Whisker Plots provide an excellent method of
obtaining this information at a glance. Detailed informa-
tion on Box and Whisker Plots, their construction and the
information they provide may be found in Appendix E. Figure
5a displays multiple box and whisker plots for the number of
flights each month of the Fiscal Year and Figure 5b displays
the same information for the total hours flown each month.
Considerable variability is obvious without the need for
further testing. However, no seasonal trend is discernable.
2. Draftsman's Plot
One of the best methods of obtaining a broad over-
view of the individual variables in a data sample is through
a Draftsman's Plot. Thomas, in Appendix A of his Master's
Thesis [Ref. 9], presents an excellent technical discussion
of the Draftsman's Plot and its advantages. Briefly, a
Draftsman's Plot is a 'matrix' of small scatterplots. Each
variable is represented by a both row and a column. Thus
when viewed as a whole, the Draftsman's plot shows the plot
of every variable versus every other variable. For example,
the upper left plot of Figure F.2 in Appendix F shows a
standard scatterplot of average flights per month per air-
craft versus average flights per month. Each point
corresponds to the value of the pair of variables for one
home base. In the case of the present database, a full
display of such a plot would require 90 individual scatter-
plots, a very large display even given the small size of the
44
individual plots. However, 45 of the individual plots are
diagonally mirror images of each other. Therefore, only a
half display is presented in this thesis. Even with this
reduction, legibility requires the use of several pages to
display the plot, so it has been placed in Appendix F.
Individual scatterplots of interest from this appendix are
reproduced in Figure 6.
The first thing of interest in Appendix F is the
large number of plots with points randomly scattered
suggesting that there is no correlation between most pairs
of variables. This is not unusual however; it should not be
expected that all variables would show a correlation. The
following seven plots. Figure 6, exhibit possible trends and
will be investigated further in Chapter IV. They are:
- Average number of flights per month per aircraft versus
average number of flights per month;
- Average number of hours per month per aircraft versus
average number of flights per month;
- Average hours per month versus average number of flights
per month;
- Average deadhead cost per flight versus average number
of flights per month;
- Average percentage of deadhead distance versus average
deadhead cost per flight;
- Average number of legs per flight versus average
deadhead cost per flight;
- Average passenger capacity utilization versus average
percentage of deadhead distance.
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Next we look at the entire row of Appendix F having
average capacity utilization as the ordinate. This entire
row, reproduced in Figure 1, shows one value well above the
others. Similarly, the row having average number of legs
per flight on the ordinate and displayed in Figure 8, shows
two values well above the others. The reasons for these
'outliers' will be investigated further in Chapter IV.
3. Analysis of Coded Scatterplots
The simple enlargement of the scatterplots of
interest will not reveal any additional information. How-
ever, coding the points (bases) with the number of aircraft
at each introduces a visible means for considering this as
a third variable without needing to explore three-
dimensional graphics displays. Thus, different symbols are
used for each base depending on the number of planes
assigned to it. The graphs can then be examined for the
potential effects of the two plotted variables on the
number of planes assigned - or visa versa.
a. Variable Pairs Stratified by the Number of Planes
Figure 9 presents two Coded Scatterplots which
show data strongly stratified by the number of aircraft. In
each case, a measure of performance per aircraft is plotted
against a measure of total base performance. In both plots,
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into the number of aircraft assigned to each base. A closer
examination of the variables of interest indicate a direct
correlation:
- Average hours or flights per month divided by the
number of aircraft assigned equals the average
hours or flights per month per aircraft.
They are obviously of no further interest.
b. Variable Pairs Involving Deadhead Data.
Four variable pairs from the Draftsman's Plot,
all stratified by the number of aircraft and involving data
about deadhead legs in one form or another, indicated
potential trends. The Coded Scatterplots are shown in
Figure 10.
Figure 10a, average deadhead cost per flight
versus average number of flights per month, tends to support
an intuitive feeling that the average deadhead cost per
flight should decline as more flights are flown. Addition-
ally, it appears that there may be some grouping by the
number of aircraft assigned to the base, particularly
between those bases with only one aircraft and those bases
with more than one aircraft.
In Figure 10b, average deadhead cost per flight
versus average percentage of deadhead distance, a strong
positive correlation is evident. Again, this is consistent
with an intuitive expectation of what should be the case
with these two variables. However, there appears to be no
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Figure 10c, average deadhead cost per flight
versus average number of legs per flight appears to show a
strong grouping but does not exhibit much trend across the
graph. This is one of the series of plots discussed in
Section 2 above where further investigation of outliers
appears needed. The axes have been reversed from Figure 8 to
allow easier visual comparison with the other graphs in
Figure 10 and the outliers are now to the right of the graph
rather than on the top. However, the labelling has produced
an additional piece of information for that investigation -
both outliers are bases with only one aircraft. There is
some evidence of grouping by the number of assigned air-
craft, particularly at the bases with three aircraft. This
will be reexamined in Chapter IV after other graphs have
been analyzed.
Figure lOd, average passenger capacity utiliza-
tion versus average percentage of deadhead distance, is
difficult to analyze visually because of the outliers.
Disregarding the endpoints of zero and 100 percent capacity
utilization, there is neither an intuitive nor a
computational connection between the variables. However, it
appears that average capacity utilization decreases as the
average percentage of deadhead distance increases. No
grouping by number of aircraft assigned is evident.
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c. Variable Pairs involving Hours versus Flights.
Although many of the variables that have been
examined are useful in determining how efficiently the
system is operating, the variables now under consideration
appear to have the greatest potential for describing how the
system should operate. Intuitively, both the number of
flights each base flies and the average operating hours of
each aircraft should be correlated. As Figure 11 shows,
there is indeed a strong positive correlation between the
two coordinate variables. However, there is even more
information being provided. The groupings by numbers of
aircraft tend to overlap as the coordinate values increase.
If, on the other hand, each base was operating at approx-
imately the same efficiency, a strong grouping by the number
of aircraft assigned should be expected. This overlapping
suggests that some bases are more efficient than others. In
particular, there is one base with only one aircraft
assigned which has a significantly better performance than
other one-aircraft bases and two two-aircraft bases appear
to be doing the same work as those bases with three
aircraft. At the other extreme, three two-aircraft bases
appear to be noticeably less efficient than other bases
with the same number of aircraft. Finally, the grouping for
bases with three aircraft assigned appears highly variable.
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The next step is to determine which points are
associated with which bases and investigate why specific
bases have consistently different performance than the rest
of the bases with the same number of aircraft.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has made use of several initial data
analysis techniques to identify variables to consider
further. In particular. Draftsman's Plots have pointed out
several variable pairs with strong correlation and Coded
Scatterplots have disclosed some outliers in the data. All
of these aspects will be considered in the next chapter.
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IV. DETAILED ANALYSIS RESULTS
Chapter III suggested several aspects the data which
should be considered in more detail. This chapter examines
these aspects and discusses both the methods used in the
detailed analysis and the results of the analysis.
A. VARIABLE PAIRS INVOLVING HOURS VERSUS FLIGHTS
As discussed in Chapter III.B.3.C, the most intuitively
satisfying indication of how well the system is operating is
to consider both the number of flights flown and the number
of hours flown. Comparing these same two variables for each
base with the same number of aircraft assigned should
provide the most direct indication of relative efficiency
between bases.
Figure 11 of Chapter III presented a plot involving
Average Hours per Month Hours versus Average Flights per
Month. While either annual totals or monthly averages would
have been appropriate, two pieces of information discovered
during the initial aggregation efforts lead to the conclu-
sion that the plot of average hours per month versus
average flights per month would provide the most accurate
description of the system as it actually functioned in
Fiscal Year 1983.
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First, it was necessary to determine how many C-12
aircraft were assigned to which bases during each month of
1983. The inclusion in the Logistics Flight Record of the
Bureau Serial Number of the aircraft flying a given leg
provided a simple method to determine this required informa-
tion. However, during this aggregation, an aircraft was
discovered which appeared to spend approximately 20 percent
of its time flying out of Jacksonville, Florida, and approx-
imately 80 percent of its time flying out Norfolk, Virginia.
Since the aircraft appeared at both bases throughout the
year, a reassignment of assets was ruled out.
Second, it was discovered that Dallas, Texas, lost an
aircraft on or about December 1, 1982. This aircraft seems
to have subsequently disappeared from the database. Also on
or about December 1, 1982, Glenview, Illinois, appears to
have transferred one of its aircraft to Selfridge Air
National Guard Base. Since the monthly average figures were
computed based on the number of months the base was in
operation, the monthly averages can take these changes into
account while annual totals cannot.
Figure 12 recreates Figure 11 with a fourth piece of
information added - each point is labelled with the name of
the base whose data it represents. The numbers in paren-
theses for Jacksonville and Norfolk show the effective
number of aircraft assigned to the each base as a result of
the one aircraft discussed above which split its time
58
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between those two bases. This additional labelling suggests
specific bases for which effectiveness seems unusual. These
include Alameda, California; Corpus Christi, Texas; Whidbey
Island, Washington; Glenview, Illinois; El Toro, California;
North Island, California; Brunswick, Maine; and Willow
Grove, Pennsylvania. Each of these bases will be examined
in detail below.
1. Naval Air Station Alameda
The two aircraft assigned to the Naval Air Station,
Alameda, are scheduled by NALCOEP, and the Operations
Officer for that command is one of the pilots regularly
assigned by the base to fly C-12 missions. An in-depth
investigation of the database for Alameda was conducted
before discussing Figure 12 with NALCOEP. An examination of
the flight records for Alameda did not disclose any obvious
problems, there were flights by both aircraft in every
month. When Figure 12 was shown to the Operations Officer
[Ref. 10], he explained that Alameda was at that time
experiencing difficulties in obtaining crews to fly the
aircraft. This functionally limited Alameda to approximately
80 hours per month, a figure which the command itself
pointed out could be easily conducted with only one
aircraft.
60
2. Glenview, Whidbey Island^ and Corpus Christi
Glenview and Corpus Christi are scheduled by NALO in
New Orleans, Louisiana, while Whidbey Island is scheduled by
NALCOEP. During the discussions with the NALCOEP Operations
Officer about Alameda, Whidbey Island's position on the plot
in Figure 12 was also discussed. Here again, the database
had appeared to be complete, and there appeared to be no
obvious reason for a base with two assigned aircraft to
perform as if it only needed one. NALCOEP indicated that
this was a demand related problem and that although two
aircraft were not utilized efficiently, the loss of one
aircraft would result in an increase in unfilled demand. It
would also have a significant adverse impact on morale and
training as well as on administrative support in the area.
While Whidbey Island does support larger aircraft such as
the DC-9, the 90 passenger capacity of that aircraft makes
it inefficient for transporting small groups of people.
Additionally, the size of the aircraft limits the locations
it can serve. The Whidbey Island area, somewhat isolated
from the rest of the Naval community, includes the Pudget
Sound Naval Shipyard and the Trident Submarine Base at
Bangor. With the buildup of the Trident program, demand
in the area is expected to increase and NALCOEP felt that
two C-12 aircraft would continue to be required in Whidbey
Island.
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Flight records for Glenview and Corpus Christi were
also examined without discovering any of the problems men-
tioned above. Discussions were then conducted with the
scheduler at NALO in an attempt to discover reasons for the
relative performance of these two bases [Ref. 11]. Although
it proved to be somewhat difficult by telephone to convey
the information contained in Figure 12, the following facts
were established. First, the situation at Corpus Christi is
very similar to Whidbey Island... too much demand for one
aircraft but not enough demand to keep two aircraft busy.
Corpus Christi also supports the DC-9 aircraft, but again
the aircraft has efficiency and base support limitations.
There was no feel on the part of the scheduler as to whether
business was increasing or decreasing in the Corpus Christi
area.
On the other hand, Glenview has one aircraft which
appears to represent about the maximum performance
capability for one aircraft. The scheduler indicated that
he regularly "worked the hell out of that (Glenview) air-
craft." [Ref. 11] Although Glenview is also somewhat iso-
lated from the bulk of the Navy community, there is a large
volume of Naval Reserve business in the midwest. Several
bases in the area support the larger DC-9 aircraft, but the
bulk of small passenger transportation in the Reserves is
assigned to Glenview, the only major Navy base in the area
with small aircraft.
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3. Low Demand^ One Aircraft Bases
Two bases can be seen in the lower left-hand corner
of Figure 12. Brunswick, Maine, and Willow Grove, Pennsyl-
vania, are both scheduled by NALO. Discussions with the
scheduler [Ref. 11] indicated that both bases have a very
small customer base consisting primarily of reserve activi-
ties. The elimination of aircraft from these two bases
would drastically curtail any administrative travel and
increase "Navy Active Duty for Training" travel expenses.
4, The Boundary Between Two and Three Aircraft
Figure 12 is much less clear when considering the
difference between two and three aircraft. The differences
between North Island and El Tore tend to diffuse the
boundary between two and three aircraft. Schedulers for the
aircraft at El Toro, a Marine Corps Air Station scheduled by
Commander Marine Corp Air Bases West (COMCABWEST) , main-
tained that they were unable to meet all requests for
service with only two aircraft, a statement which could not
be verified without obtaining a new tape file.
NALCOEP, the scheduler for North Island could offer
no concrete reasoning for the performance of the three
aircraft assigned to Naval Air Station North Island, rela-
tive to the other bases with three aircraft. It was
generally felt that part of the performance might be
affected by the presence of two T-39 aircraft in San Diego.
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The T-39 is a seven-passenger jet aircraft with a higher
airspeed and longer range. Unfortunately, it is reputed to
have a lower mean time between failures than the C-12 air-
craft, and NALCOEP felt that three C-12 aircraft were neces-
sary to absorb the demand created by the higher downtime
associated with the T-39. This issue was not examined in
any depth because it surfaced too late in the analysis for
the author to obtain the data necessary for a full
investigation of the phenomenon.
It is interesting to note that both Norfolk and
North Island, which have lower average hours per month
performance than the other two bases which have three C-12
aircraft also are major fleet concentration points which
must deal with carrier task force deployments and returns.
The demands placed on the Naval Air Logistics System by the
massive movement of men and equipment when carriers gear up
for, or return from, a deployment is well documented in the
larger (C-9) aircraft data. It is possible that three C-12
aircraft may also be necessary to deal with the surge from
this evolution.
It is fairly easy to visualize a straight line on
Figure 12 running roughly between New Orleans, Washington,
D. C, and Norfolk, Virginia. Such a line would also fit
Jacksonville quite well. As discussed earlier, the Jackson-
ville and Norfolk bases appear to share five aircraft with a
large majority of the flight time for the fifth aircraft
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devoted to Norfolk. This would seem to indicate that
Jacksonville and Norfolk could have supported three aircraft
each.
B. VARIABLE PAIRS INVOLVING DEADHEAD DATA.
The four plots presented in Figure 10 initially appeared
to be of limited value. This is not changed by the coding
of points by base names. In Figure 10a, average deadhead
cost per flight versus average flights per month, there are
three two-aircraft bases that appeared to have a lower
relative performance when compared to the rest of the two-
aircraft group. As could be surmised from Figure 12, these
three bases were Alameda, Corpus Christi, and Whidbey
Island. However, even with this additional labelling, that
plot does not appear to offer any further information of
interest.
In Chapter III it was pointed out that Figure 10b,
average deadhead cost per flight versus average percentage
of deadhead distance, appeared to follow what would be
expected with those two variables. No obvious groupings by
number of aircraft was evident. The additional information
available from knowing which points correspond to which
bases does not increase the usefulness of this plot and it
will not be considered further.
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Figure 10c, average deadhead cost per flight versus
average number of legs per flight, displayed some possible
grouping by number of assigned aircraft. However, the addi-
tional labelling did not provide any rational for such
groupings. The one three aircraft base with the lower
ordinate value was Washington, D. C, while the one aircraft
base in the same vicinity was Pensacola. Neither of these
bases has shown any tendency to stand out from their respec-
tive groups on other graphs. The reasons for this inconsis-
tency did not appear to have a significant bearing on the
question under investigation and were not pursued.
Chapter III briefly mentioned that in Figure lOd,
the end points of the average capacity utilization appeared
to be highly correlated with the corresponding values for
the average percentage of deadhead distance, but dismissed
these points as the only points where that happened. As an
example, it is obvious that the average number of seats used
per leg, and therefore per flight, can be changed without
changing ratio of deadhead legs to total legs. Even with
the additional labelling, no reason for the apparent
correlation could be identified.
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C. DRAFTSMAN'S PLOT OUTLIERS
The analysis of the Draftsman's Plot in Chapter III
pointed out two variables with potential outliers. After
identifying the bases involved, the flight records of these
bases were examined and the results are summarized below.
1. Average Number of Legs per Flight
In reviewing the Draftsman's Plot, two bases consis-
tently plotted higher average number of legs per flight than
other bases against all other variables. Investigation
revealed that these two bases were Glenview with an average
of 4.75 legs per flight, and Selfridge with an average of
4.39 legs per flight. An examination of the flight records
for these two bases did not reveal any reason for the higher
average. In attempting to determine a reason for this
behavior, an assumption was made that perhaps there were
more legs because each leg was shorter. The average
distance per leg was then computed for each of the bases and
for the system as a whole. Glenview's average of 367.87
miles per leg and Selfridge's average of 356.06 miles per
leg were both above the system average of 332.67 miles per
leg. Both bases are in the midwest and there are no other
small aircraft bases in the region, but there does not
appear to be any other similarities except for the obvious
'Number of Aircraft'. Discussions with the scheduler in New
Orleans [Ref. 11] produced no reasons for this anomoly.
Since the same scheduler provides scheduling services for
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more than just these two bases, it would not appear to be
unique to the scheduler and must therefore be assumed to be
a geographic phenomenon.
2. Average Capacity Utilization
The outlier in Figure 7 was Whidbey Island. Flight
Records were examined closely. Table C.4 discusses the
Logistics Flight Report File data structure and defines
passenger capacity as the number of passengers which could
have been carried had the aircraft been full. In the data-
base for Whidbey Island, this field consistently recorded
less than the seven passengers the aircraft can normally
carry. While this was the direct cause of the high utili-
zation percentage, neither the database nor the scheduler,
NALCOEP, could explain the reason for the reduced passenger
capacity. It is possible that this lower figure was caused
by using seats to hold small cargo. It could also be caused
by damaged seats which were unusable. It could also reflect
a misunderstanding on the use of the Logistics Flight Report
form. No conclusions could be drawn from the information
available in the database. However, the 93 percent capacity




This chapter has presented a detailed analyses of poten-
tially fruitful aspects suggested in Chapter III for
evaluating and comparing the efficiency of operations at the
various bases. Plots were expanded and specific data points
were identified as representing specific bases. Flight
records were then closely examined and schedulers were
interviewed. Where possible, justification for the number
of aircraft assigned to a base was determined. The major
plot of interest turned out to be average hours per month
versus average flights per month with the number of aircraft
assigned to each base also shown.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The initial purpose of this thesis was to determine
potential home bases for additional C-12 aircraft expected
under a continuing five-year procurement plan. Since no
previous analysis had been conducted, a top-down approach
was taken. First, the organization of the Navy Air Logis-
tics System was examined and the structure of the available
data was discussed. The data was aggregated from indi-
vidual legs to flights and then sorted by home base. Basic
questions about the resulting database, such as the distri-
bution of flight times and the distribution of the number of
legs per flight were discussed using basic frequency histo-
grams. Exploratory data analysis techniques, such as
multiple Box and Whisker Plots and Draftsman's Plots, were
then used to assess the data. Seven variable pairs were
discovered which exhibited potential correlation and two
individual variables displayed possible outliers. Coded
Scatterplots, depicting the number of aircraft at each
point, were used to look for correlation between data pairs
and number of aircraft. After identifying bases with
unusual behavior when compared to other bases with the same
number of aircraft, detailed examination of the Logistics
Flight Report File and discussions with the cognizant
schedulers were used to determine reasons for such behavior.
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Bases having potential outlier values in the variables of
average capacity utilization and average number of legs per
flight were identified and examined, but no reasons for the
unusual behavior could be positively identified.
This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations
for further study. However, the rich variety of operations
and aircraft types that make up the entire system creates a
pattern of interdependence which cannot be totally avoided.
The conclusions which are drawn from the information
presented here must necessarily be considered in that
context.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The first and most obvious conclusion that can be drawn
is that Naval Air Station Alameda appears to have one too
many aircraft for the crews it can provide. The observation
from NALCOEP that those aircraft can not be scheduled for
more than a total of 80 hours per month is clearly depicted
in the operating data. The aircraft stationed there are
significantly underutilized and constitute wasted resources.
Serious attempts should be made to obtain additional crews,
perhaps even some NALO billets should be obtained. However,
if this is not possible one of the aircraft should be trans-
ferred to another base where crews are available. This
would allow better utilization of the aircraft and improve
overall system performance. Additionally, if the aircraft
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were placed at a west coast base within reasonable flying
time of Alameda, service to Alameda customers might actually
be improved by increased use of the aircraft.
Second, Naval Air Station Glenview represents the
maximum operating tempo feasible with one aircraft. Even
the command responsible for scheduling that aircraft
believes that no more can be done with it. The superior
performance level of this aircraft is as noticeable as the
substandard performance of the two aircraft at NAS Alameda.
One of the recommendations for further study involves this
aircraft.
Third, Naval Air Stations Whidbey Island and Corpus
Christi probably represent the lowest acceptable operating
level for two aircraft. The data regarding these two
stations may be interpreted in various ways. Both stations
should be monitored closely with regard to levels of demand.
Any measureable drop in business should be followed by a
transfer of one of the aircraft to another base.
Fourth, Naval Air Station North Island represents the
minimum operating tempo which may justify three aircraft. A
final decision on this matter may well depend on several
other factors including the utilization of the T-39 aircraft
or the demands of carrier evolutions and is outside the
scope of this investigation.
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Fifth, Naval Air Stations Jacksonville and Norfolk
require additional monitoring with regard to demand levels.
An increasing level of business could quickly outpace the
"swing" aircraft arrangement use in Fiscal Year 1983. The
operating tempo of the two bases could have supported three
aircraft each during the period under investigation.
If a regression line was drawn on Figure 12 from the
origin to approximately 320 hours per month (on the right
axis), one might then establish a minimum point on the line
for any number of aircraft by assuming that Brunswick and
Willow Grove were located at the minimum for one aircraft.
Multiplying these coordinates by the number of aircraft to
be considered would then provide a minimum point on the
regression line for that number of aircraft. A line at that
point, drawn perpendicular to the regression line might
provide a reasonable starting point in determining whether a
base should have a specified number of aircraft. However,
this can not be interpreted as a hard and fast rule. It
could serve only as a rough rule of thumb useful for deter-
mining a place to start. Many other factors having nothing
to do with flight hours and number of flights also affect
the final decision.
Sixth, the next aircraft received under the five-year
procurement plan should go to Glenview, followed by the
assignment of a sixth aircraft to the Jacksonville or
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Norfolk area. Further recommendations would be futile
until additional lost customer studies are performed as
discussed below.
Finally, a large amount of study remains to be done.
This analysis has only scratched the surface. Directions
for further study are recommended below.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Many more questions have been raised than were answered
in this analysis and opportunities exist for further study
and analysis. Some of the following recommendations could be
best pursued by the Navy Air Logistics System and its sub-
ordinate commands. Others would best be pursued as the
subjects of subsequent theses or faculty research.
Of critical importance is a study of system demand for
service, particularly those demands which are not being met.
Such a study should examine the geographic locations of
origins and destinations for requested flights for potential
new locations for C-12 home bases. This will require an in-
depth analysis of 'the' Flight Advisory File and Flight
Request File for those flight requests which were not met.
However, in view of the discussion in Chapter II. D, the
validity of the Flight Requests must first be determined.
Stratifying the Flight requests by the number of days or
hours before (or after) the requested departure time should
prove to be quite enlightening, as should stratification of
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rejected requests by the day of the week the flight was
desired. Major recommendations concerning the location of
additional assets can not be made without fully
understanding the types of service demanded and the
geographic spread of such demands, based on a database free
of requests for service made after the service was needed.
Funding of customers to allow them to obtain alternative
means of transportation when the system cannot provide
service needs to be addressed. This issue was not raised in
the analysis because it is obviously a major topic in its
own right. However, many of the discussions with schedulers
about aircraft assignments and decreasing service included
this topic. The main contention was that for many of the
system's passengers, if the flights are not available from
the Navy Air Logistics System, the flights are not taken at
all. However, this does not imply unnecessary travel. While
commercial flights require the sponsoring command to pay for
the airplane ticket and MAC flights are charged to the
sponsoring command's travel funds, flights in the Air
Logistics System are currently free for local commands. As
the system now operates, if local commands had to start
paying for travel to schools, in many cases the travel would
not be performed and the schools would not be attended.
While the cost per hour figure of $120.00 used in this
analysis is strictly an accounting figure, it could be used
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impute a cost which the Navy is willing to pay to retain the
opportunity for educational travel.
The interrelationships of the system need significantly
better definition. How do multiple aircraft types serving
the same geographic area interact? Could overall efficiency
be increased by using smaller aircraft such as the C-12 as
feeder aircraft to the larger planes such as the DC-9? Can
this be done without beginning to schedule any or all of the
aircraft ahead of time? Would system efficiency be
increased by placing the C-12 into a squadron environment
rather than assigning them as base aircraft as is currently
done? Where should such squadrons be located? Would this
increase deadhead time and cost? Would it decrease
maintenance downtime and cost? The answer to these types of
questions could potentially result in large-scale savings to
the Navy.
Surge capability needs to addressed. The Navy is a
military organization whose overall mission is to be ready
for war. Can a system like the Navy Air Logistics System be
equipped to perform capably in a wartime environment and
still operate efficiently in a peacetime environment? On a
smaller scale, how much excess system capacity is necessary
to manage evolutions such as carrier onloads and offloads?
Can the Navy afford this excess capacity? Would commercial
charter for these evolutions be more cost-effective?
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The cost of overextending the system should also be
addressed. Currently, only one aircraft could possibly be
considered overextended, but what would be the ultimate cost
if that situation became more prevalent? Would more TAD
funds be required to accomplish even minimal training? How
much more? Would aircraft safety or corrosion control
deteriorate?
The overall mission of the Navy Air Logistics System
also needs to be reexamined. Justification for the current
aircraft procurement program appears to have been done with-
out significant input from the Air Logistics System. Written
specification of uses for which the C-12 aircraft were
purchased do not appear to be available within the system.
Questions of policy regarding minimum service levels need to
be formulated in detail and examined. The low demand at
Brunswick and Willow Grove, for example, points out the need
to determine a minimum demand criteria to justify permanent
assignment of an aircraft. Additionally, one of the
biggest single sources of inefficiency seems to be the
requirement, spelled out in OPNAVINST 4631. 2B, to avoid
competition with the Military Airlift Command and commercial
aviation. Intuitively, higher aircraft utilization and
efficiency could be obtained with scheduled flights, a
methodology that remains unused under current interpre-
tations of the mission requirement.
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C. FINAL OBSERVATION
It is paramount to Navy credibility that assets in all
areas are used wisely and efficiently without unduly jeopar-
dizing wartime capability. The logistics system within the
Navy has been under intense fire in recent years for waste
and inefficiency. As mentioned in Chapter I, part of the
logistics system, the Navy Air Logistics System, has speci-
fically been severely criticized for waste and inefficient
use of assets. With critical analysis, this area appears
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Date/Time Group of message request
or customer arrival at walk-up
window.
Two letter designation to separate
and identify each flight requested.
Date/Time Group of entry into the
database
.
Which scheduling activity actually
scheduled the flight. Entered by
the scheduling activities.
Which scheduling activity received
the original request for service.
Reason for not scheduling the
flight, from OPNAVINST 4631. 2B.
Reason for cancelling an already
scheduled flight, from OPNAVINST
4631. 2B
Internat'l Air Carrier Organi-
zation Code for location of
requested departure
Code for the location of required
delivery
Date/Time Group of the requested
arrival time.
Date/Time Group of the requested
departure time.
Date/Time Group of the latest
acceptable arrival time
















Number of passengers for which
transportation is requested.
Weight of accompanied baggage
to be flown.
Total weight of unaccompanied
cargo to be flown.
Total cubic feet of scheduled
cargo shipment.
Codes used to indicate cargo that
may require special handling such
as hazardous, toxic, etc.
Length, height, width, and weight
of largest single piece of cargo.
Same information on the heaviest
single piece of cargo.
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Name and phone number of
36 requestor's coordinator at
actual departure.
Name and phone number of
36 requestor's coordinator at
actual arrival.
VIP-Code If a Senior Military Officer or
civilian is to be transported,
this code indicates grade and
rank.





Free-form for any additional info.































A number to designate which leg
of the flight the data on the line
refers to.
Date/Time Group of outgoing
message
Date/Time Group of entry in DBMS.
Command scheduling the flight.
Note that this may not be the
scheduling command that received
the initial request.
If this message is cancelling a
flight for which a flight advisory
message had been issued, this code
indicates the reason for the
cancellation.
Type of aircraft scheduled to fly.
Configuration of aircraft to be
used. Applicable to DC-9,
primarily
Estimated arrival time at location
indicated in record.
Estimated departure time from same
location.
Location to which estimated
arrival and departure times apply.
Number of seats available leaving
the indicated location. Different





Baggage-Weight 5 Pounds of baggage available
leaving the indicated location.
Different than the pounds of
baggage scheduled for departure.
Cargo-Weight 5 Pounds of cargo available
leaving the indicated location.
Different than pounds scheduled
for* departure.
Cargo-Dimensions 35 See table C.l.
(4 fields)
Modification-Counter 2 Indicates which modification of an
























10 Departure time of lift.
2 Matches a specific leg on the
flight to a specific request on
the original flight request.
6 Unit Identification Code (UIC) of
requestor.
9 Scheduler assigned flight number.
2 Which leg of the flight this line
or record refers to.
2 The scheduling command scheduling
this lift.
2 The scheduling command scheduling
this flight.
1 Reason for cancelling previously
scheduling lift.
4 Departure location code.
4 Arrival location code.
3 Seats available on this leg.
5 Pounds of baggage available for
use.
5 Pounds of cargo available for use.
4 Dimensions of unused cargo space.
4 Applicable Priority and Purpose




Coordinator-Info 36 Requestor coordinator name/phone
Unit-Lifted 10 Plain language short title of
unit receiving service.
Modification-Counter 2 Indicates a modification to a
previously scheduled lift.
Aircraft-Type 7 Not used in FY83 Data File.
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Table C.4
















9 Scheduler assigned flight number.
2 Identification of specific leg
of the flight.











6 Aircraft Bureau Serial number.




10 Time of departure.
10 Time of arrival.
4 Departure location code.
4 Arrival location code.
Number of scheduled passengers.
Pounds of scheduled cargo.
Number of opportune lift
passengers
Pounds of opportune lift cargo
Cargo type codes
Total number of passenger that
can be carried on the flight.
Cargo capacity for flight.
Air time for leg in hours.
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APPENDIX E
Box and Whisker Plots
Box and whisker plots provide a rapid 'impression' of the
distribution of a data sample, providing an excellent method
of gaining an overview of the data when details are not
necessary/ or when several samples need to be compared.
Chambers [Ref. 12] discusses the several parts of the Box
and Whisker Plot in great detail. However, a brief summary
of the parts of the plot are provided below.
The box itself is constructed to cover that portion of
the sample between the upper and lower quartile, or the
twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile. The median is
shown by a line or any other distinguishing mark. In a
regular box and whisker plot, the width of the box has no
significance. A comparison of the location of the median
within the box can give a quick impression of the symmetry
of the distribution.
The whiskers, or solid lines extending from the box,
indicate the bulk of the mass in the tails of the distribu-
tion and give a visual indication of the spread of the data.
A well balanced sample will have both an upper and lower
whisker of approximately the same length while a highly
skewed sample may have only one whisker. The length of each
whisker is a function of an actual point in the sample as
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follows. The end of the upper line, or whisker, is that
value in the sample which is less than or equal to the upper
quartile plus the interquartile distance. The end of the
lower whisker is that value in the sample which is greater
than or equal to the lower quartile minus the interquartile
distance. The interquartile distance is defined as the
upper quartile minus the lower quartile.
In addition to the box and the whiskers, there may be
individual points beyond the whiskers. These points may be
either solid or blank. The blank circles indicate values
between the end of the whisker and a theoretical value lying
1.5 interquartile distances above the upper quartile, or
below the lower quartile. Solid circles reflect points out-
side this range and indicate data points that may be
outliers and should be investigated.
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APPENDIX F
The following pages present the original Draftsman's
Plot of the variables used in this analysis. Each row of
plot is labelled only once, on the far left side.
Similarly, each column of plots is labelled only at the
bottom of the column. To assist the reader in visualizing
the complete Draftsman's Plot, the following pages are




I Part A I
I IIII
I Part B I Part C III
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